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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to examine whether or not Blue Cross and Blue
Shield suffered from an adverse selection death spiral after for-profit commercial insurance
companies entered the market for health insurance. Results suggest that moving to experience rating
may have helped the Blues counteract adverse selection in the group health insurance market.
Adverse selection posed a greater problem for the Blues in the market for individual health insurance,
possibly because of differences in the way the Blues screened potential enrollees relative to
commercial insurance companies. 
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  Mandated community rating—the practice of restricting the ability of insurance companies to rate 
potential policyholders based on age, gender, or other risk factors—has been proposed or implemented in 
several states since the 1990s as a means of increasing insurance coverage among high-risk groups who 
would otherwise not be able to afford coverage. In the absence of community rating, insurance companies 
use experience rating, charging each subscriber a rate based on his or her expected claims. Thus, younger, 
healthier enrollees pay lower premiums than older enrollees. While the goal of community rating reforms 
is to increase coverage in the market, there is some concern that requiring insurance companies to charge 
everyone in a market the same rate may lead to an “adverse selection death spiral” in which younger, 
healthier enrollees actually abandon coverage as their premiums rise (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997; Cutler 
and Reber, 1998).  
  The evidence on whether or not adverse selection death spirals resulted when mandated 
community rating reforms were implemented in the 1990s is mixed. Some papers argue that adverse 
selection death spirals generated a reduction in insurance coverage in affected markets, while others find 
that insurance reforms caused virtually no change in insurance coverage (see Buchmueller and DiNardo, 
2002). This paper sheds light on this issue by looking at the health insurance market from an historical 
perspective. Originally, Blue Cross and Blue Shield (the Blues) community rated all of their policies, 
since one of their purported goals was to extend access to medical services to all segments of the 
population (Eilers, p. 210). However, over time most Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans abandoned 
community rating.
1 Was this because the Blues experienced a situation similar to that of an adverse 
                                                 
1 Because they community rated their policies, the Blues were allowed to incorporate as nonprofit organizations in 
the 1930s and receive tax-exempt status (see Eilers, 1963 and Reed, 1947 for greater discussion of the birth of the 
Blues). However, the federal tax exemption that the Blues enjoyed was limited in 1986 after a GAO report 
concluded that there was very little difference in the rating practices of the nonprofit Blues and the for-profit 
commercial insurance companies (GAO, 1986, p. 2). Subsequently, after a 1994 change repealed the requirement in 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield licensing law that plans be nonprofit, several Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans 
elected to drop their nonprofit status (and the rating restrictions that accompanied it) and convert to for-profit 
corporations. See Cunningham, pp. 215, 247-48 and Sherrid, pp. 51-52.   2
selection death spiral as their enrollees abandoned the Blues in favor of less expensive coverage from 
commercial health insurance firms? 
  Using a unique data set from 1957, this paper compares the characteristics and medical 
expenditures of Blue Cross and Blue Shield enrollees with those of commercial firms in order to examine 
how selection may have affected the Blues. The data used are ideal for looking at this issue because they 
provide a snapshot of the health insurance market at a time when Blue Cross and Blue Shield community 
rated the majority of their policies while competing with for-profit, commercial health insurance 
companies that engaged in experience rating. Despite the fact that the Blues mostly engaged in 
community rating, results show that in the group market, the Blues did not attract poor risks relative to 
their commercial counterparts. However, in the individual market, analysis confirms that the Blues did 
suffer from adverse selection that may have ultimately led them to abandon community rating. 
 
2.  THE 1950s HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 
  In the 1950s, the nonprofit Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans and the for-profit commercial 
insurance companies provided health insurance on either a group or an individual basis, with group 
contracts accounting for 68 percent of commercial insurance company business (Source Book of Health 
Insurance Data, 1976-1977, p. 23).
2 Health insurance plans in the 1950s were simpler than they are 
today. Blue Cross provided room and board hospital service benefits, in which the Blue Cross plan 
reimbursed hospitals directly (and in full) for providing room and board to subscribers. Blue Shield 
covered surgical fees and physicians’ charges during a patient’s hospital stay. Rarely, Blue Shield plans 
covered visits to doctors’ offices. Some Blue Shield plans also operated on a service benefit basis, 
reimbursing physicians directly for charges in full. However, Blue Shield plans usually only offered 
service benefits to patients under a certain income level. More frequently, Blue Shield plans reimbursed 
                                                 
2 While Blue Cross and Blue Shield do not separately report the number of group and individual subscribers, Eilers 
estimates that roughly three-quarters of Blue Cross and Blue Shield business came from group contracts (Eilers 
1963, p. 27).   3
physicians according to a fee schedule, and then physicians could balance bill patients for the difference 
between their customary charge and the Blue Shield reimbursement (Eilers, 1963; Reed, 1947).
3 
  Both Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans community rated their policies. Thus, the plans charged 
low risks and high risks alike the same, average rate.
4 When the plans first formed in the 1930s, the Blues 
faced little competition since commercial, for-profit insurance companies were reluctant to insure a 
commodity that they believed would suffer from severe adverse selection and moral hazard (Eilers, 1963, 
p. 13). However, the Blues showed that problems with adverse selection could be overcome by insuring 
groups of relatively healthy workers, and that moral hazard could be limited by predominantly writing 
insurance contracts that replaced traditional indemnity benefits with service benefits for hospital care and 
physicians’ service during a patient’s hospitalization. After witnessing the success of Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield, commercial firms entered the health insurance market in the 1940s and the market grew rapidly. 
While only 9 percent of the population had health insurance coverage in 1940, 68 percent of the 
population carried health insurance by 1960 (Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 1976-1977, p. 22). 
  In contrast to the service benefits offered by the Blues, policyholders insured by commercial 
companies were usually billed by the hospital, and received an indemnity benefit from the insurance 
company that may or may not have covered the full bill. Indemnity benefits were also offered for surgery 
(according to a set fee schedule), and for physicians’ charges during a patient’s hospitalization. Benefits 
were typically stated in terms of dollars paid per day. For example, for a child having surgery to have her 
tonsils out, the plan may have paid $10 per day in room and board to cover hospital charges, and up to 
$75 in surgical fees. 
                                                 
3 Out of 61 Blue Shield plans surveyed in 1954, only one offered only service benefits. Thirty-seven offered 
combination service and indemnity benefits, and 23 offered only indemnity benefits regardless of income. (“Health 
Inquiry: Voluntary Health Insurance.” Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House 
of Representatives, 83
rd Congress, second session, on “Available Health Plans and Group Insurance,” Part 7, 1954, 
pp. 2564b-2564d. 
4 Technically, Blue Cross and Blue Shield determined a community’s rate by combining the experience of covered 
groups, and no modifications were made on a particular group’s rate if its experience differed from the average of 
the entire class. Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans did rate group and individual members differently, and charged 
different rates for single members, members with one dependent, and members with families. See Eilers, pp. 89-90 
for greater discussion.  
   4
Commercial insurance companies used experience rating to price their policies. Under a system 
of experience rating, the morbidity experience of the policyholders is taken into account when the 
premium is determined. Thus, healthy subscribers who use little care will pay a lower premium for a 
given quantity of insurance than a subscriber who is less healthy. Experience rating allowed the 
commercial plans to charge lower rates than Blue Cross and Blue Shield for the lowest risk subscribers, 
leaving the Blues with the high-cost policyholders. By 1950, commercial insurance companies accounted 
for 45 percent of health insurance market share, as shown in Figure 1 (Source Book of Health Insurance 
Data 1976-1977, p. 23).  
 
3.  HOW DID SELECTION AFFECT THE BLUES?  
In describing the situation faced by the Blues after commercial firms entered the market, Eilers 
states: 
  Blue Cross and Blue Shield thus had some of their largest groups switch to coverages offered by 
insurance companies. A perplexing enigma developed. The departure of low-loss groups would 
leave Blue Cross-Blue Shield with predominantly high-loss elements. Rates would have to be 
increased. Higher rates in themselves would discourage the continuation of favorable groups 
remaining with the Blues, as well as deter those considering membership…(p. 215). 
 
In other words, anecdotal evidence indicates that the Blues may have been facing an adverse selection 
death spiral as their healthiest subscribers left Blue Cross and Blue Shield for newly available, less 
expensive commercial health insurance policies. In response, the Blues began to experience rate at least 
some of their group policies in the 1950s, while maintaining community rating in the individual market. 
Table 1 shows the extent to which Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans engaged in experience rating in 
1959.
5 As shown in Table 1, less than one-third of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans nationwide relied solely 
on community rating by 1959, while most plans combined community rating with experience rating for 
some group subscribers (Eilers, p. 218). 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, while the aggregate proportion of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans that engaged in experience rating is 
known, it is not known specifically which plans engaged in experience rating.    5
The implementation of experience rating by the Blues should have tempered the effect of the 
adverse selection death spiral. If experience rating did help the Blues in the group market, then medical 
expenditures for Blue Cross and Blue Shield group plan enrollees should not have been strikingly higher 
than expenditures for people enrolled in commercial group plans that provided similar benefits. Further, 
there should not be evidence of differential selection between Blue Cross and Blue Shield compared to 
commercial health insurance companies in the group health insurance market. 
Although the Blues may not have experienced a greater degree of adverse selection than 
commercial health insurance firms in the group market, this may not have been the case in the individual 
health insurance market. In the individual market, the Blues may have been more severely impacted by 
adverse selection than commercial insurance companies.
6 While commercial health insurance companies 
used rigorous criteria to screen potential individual contracts, the Blues used much less aggressive 
screening techniques. Some commercial insurance companies refused to even offer individual coverage, 
and those that did often required that prospective enrollees undergo a physical examination before they 
could buy insurance.
7 In contrast, potential individual subscribers could obtain coverage through Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield by simply filling out a “health statement.”
8 Blue Cross/Blue Shield officials were 
obviously aware of the potential for adverse selection in these circumstances, stating that in the case of 
individual enrollment,  
                                                 
6 Insurance companies were aware of the potential for severe adverse selection in the individual market. Reed (1947) 
describes a situation where some of the first Blue Cross plans offered individual coverage to all-comers, with 
“unhappy” results (pp. 61-62). In testimony before Congress in 1954, several witnesses discussed the problems that 
were associated with individual coverage. One witness, the Executive Vice President of the Health Information 
Foundation (a nonprofit organization founded to study the social and economic aspects of health and illness), stated 
that “… the whole problem of health insurance breaks down into those covered by groups and those covered through 
individual contracts…there have to be precautions taken in admitting individuals, and various restrictions, and so 
on” (House of Representative Hearings, p. 2084).  
7 Out of four health insurance plans not affiliated with a specific firm or union that were surveyed for a 
Congressional hearing regarding voluntary health insurance coverage, one plan did not enroll individuals at all. Of 
the three plans that enrolled individuals, one required a physical examination under all circumstances and had an age 
limit of 50, another required physical exams in some cases, and the third accepted individual enrollees subject to a 
medical questionnaire (House of Representative Hearings, pp. 2529-35). 
8 When Congress questioned a Blue Cross official about their individual contracts, the official replied, “We allow 
individual enrollment without any limitation except that in the case of individuals, we require a health 
statement….That is all. There is no medical statement” (House of Representative Hearings, pp. 2323).    6
There is a degree of selection against the plan where there is individual enrollment which does 
not exist when you get a cross section of the group. In other words, a man frequently knows that 
he is going to have hospitalization and he applies for it, and he forgets to mention in his 
application that he is expecting to go to the hospital” [emphasis added] (House of Representative 
Hearings, p. 2324). 
 
Thus, while commercial health insurance companies often required potential enrollees to 
complete a detailed application and undergo a physical examination prior to enrollment, Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield required only that they give a health statement. This practice enabled people with 
unobservable medical conditions to buy health insurance coverage from the Blues, even though they may 
not have been able to even purchase health insurance from commercial insurance companies. These 
people would spend more on average than otherwise similar enrollees, thus driving up costs and 




  If the Blues were indeed subject to a greater degree of adverse selection in the individual market 
than were commercial health insurance companies, then there should be evidence that the Blues attracted 
“sicker” people—in other words, that the Blues suffered from greater adverse selection based on 
unobservable characteristics. In order to test this hypothesis, this paper relies on data from the from the 
National Opinion Research Center’s (NORC) Nationwide Family Expenditures Surveys of 1958 
(Anderson, Collette and Feldman, 1963). As part of its plan to understand the types of medical expenses 
American families were incurring and discover how they were meeting those expenses, the NORC 
surveyed almost 3,000 U.S. families in 1958. The NORC surveys provide detailed information about each 
family’s medical expenditures and health insurance coverage in 1957, as well as information about the 
family’s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The surveys are useful in understanding the 
                                                 
9 Blue Cross and Blue Shield also made it easier for people terminating their group health insurance contracts to 
convert to individual contracts. While commercial insurance companies limited this practice of “group conversion,” 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were required by statute to grant conversion rights as long as the employee had 
been covered at least three months prior to leaving the workplace (Eilers, p. 171). This may have increased adverse 
selection, given that group conversion was voluntary.   7
nature of competition in the 1950s insurance market because they specifically asked insured households 
about whether they carried insurance through Blue Cross/Blue Shield or a different plan, and whether 
they obtained their insurance through a group or individually. Families were contacted in advance of the 
survey, and asked to collect information on annual medical expenditures and health insurance coverage. 
The NORC attempted to verify each family’s hospital expenditures with the hospital that provided the 
service. Summary statistics for the data set are reported in Table 2. 
  There are several ways to compare enrollees of Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans with those of 
for-profit, commercial insurance companies. One way is to look at simple means. If Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield tended to insure more costly subscribers, either because they community rated their policies or 
because they screened applicants less rigorously than commercial firms, then their enrollees may have 
spent more on medical care than did enrollees in commercial plans.
10 Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
subscribers may also have been more likely to have a chronic condition. Table 3 provides summary 
statistics for families with group and individual insurance by type (Blue Cross/Blue Shield or 
commercial), and for uninsured families.  
  Compared to uninsured families, families with any kind of insurance (either Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield or commercial, individual or group) were much more likely to be employed, and to have had a 
younger household head. Insured families were also less likely to have a family member with a chronic 
illness, and they tended to be more educated than uninsured families. Uninsured families lost an average 
of 45 days of work due to illness, compared to 23 days for families with commercial group insurance and 
38 days for families with individual Blue Cross/Blue Shield policies. However, despite the fact that 
uninsured families missed more work due to illness and were more likely to have a chronically ill family 
member, the mean medical expenditures of uninsured families were much lower than for insured 
                                                 
10 Note that insuring costly subscribers is not alone indicative of the existence of adverse selection—e.g., it might 
only indicate the presence of a separating equilibrium where sicker people choose community rated plans, pay 
higher premiums, and have greater medical expenditures than healthier people who choose experience rated plans, 
pay lower premiums, and have lower medical expenditures (see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Comparing medical 
expenditures to gauge the presence of adverse selection is only useful to the extent that plan premiums and 
characteristics are also considered.   8
households. Overall, mean total medical expenses for uninsured households equaled $314, compared to a 
high of $559 for families with an individual contract through a commercial insurance company.
11 
Among insured families, columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 suggest that families with group insurance 
through the Blues were very similar to families with commercial group insurance in terms of observable 
characteristics such as age of the household head, employment, income, and education. In addition, mean 
expenditures on hospital care were roughly similar ($252 for the Blues v. $216 for commercial plans), as 
were mean total medical expenditures ($496 for families insured with the Blues v. $459 for families 
insured with commercial firms), and mean insurance policy benefit levels. Blue Cross/Blue Shield group 
subscribers had a mean hospital benefit level of $11.34 per day, compared to $11.62 for commercial 
policyholders. Average surgical benefits were also similar: $289 for Blue Cross/Blue Shield and $273 for 
commercial firms. Mean premiums paid by enrollees are also similar, although group enrollees in Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield paid somewhat more per month than did group enrollees in commercial plans 
($7.03 v. $6.27). Looking only at simple means, then, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were similar to 
commercial firms in the group health insurance market and did not appear to suffer unduly from adverse 
selection. 
Overall, compared to enrollees in the group market, enrollees in the individual market (regardless 
of whether they were insured through the Blues or through a commercial plan) were older, had lower 
average incomes, and were less likely to be employed. They were also more likely to suffer from chronic 
illness. Comparing commercial firm enrollees with Blue Cross/Blue Shield subscribers in the individual 
health insurance market shows that their observed characteristics were much the same. The mean age of 
the household head was similar for both Blue Cross/Blue Shield and commercial firms, as was the 
number of families who report having a member with a chronic illness. About 70 percent of all insured 
families in the individual market had an employed household head. With respect to premiums, enrollees 
in Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans paid $7.38 per month on average, compared to $7.62 per month for 
                                                 
11 For insured households, total medical expenditures include amounts paid by the household and amounts paid by 
insurance.   9
commercial individual subscribers. The Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans were somewhat more generous with 
respect to benefits than the commercial plans. Families insured under an individual contract through Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield reported a mean per diem hospital benefit of $10 and a mean surgical benefit of 
$264, compared to $8.82 and $214 for families insured with commercial firms. 
With respect to medical expenditures, families insured with the Blues reported mean annual 
hospital expenditures of $288, versus $172 for families insured through individual commercial plans. 
Mean total medical expenses were $558 for the individual Blue Cross/Blue Shield families, compared to 
$356 for families with commercial insurance. Thus, even though observable characteristics between the 
two groups were very similar and enrollees in Blue Cross and Blue Shield paid less on average, medical 
expenditures for the Blues were much higher. 
This difference in medical expenditures even though observable characteristics were similar 
might be partially explained by moral hazard. For example, as noted above, Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
provided more generous benefits under individual contracts than did commercial firms, so that Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield enrollees may have subsequently spent more on medical care. However, the difference in 
average benefits does not appear sufficient to explain the large difference in medical expenditures 
between Blue Cross/Blue Shield families and families insured through commercial health insurance 
companies. 
An alternative explanation may be that the differences in medical expenditures despite similar 
observable characteristics occurred because of selection based on unobservable characteristics. Unlike 
commercial health insurance companies, Blue Cross and Blue Shield did not rigorously screen potential 
applicants, and were required to accept group-conversion enrollees. Thus, persons with unobservable 
medical conditions that could be discovered in a physical exam would have tended to purchase insurance 
through the Blues rather than from a commercial health insurance company.
12 In other words, the Blues 
may have suffered from adverse selection.  
                                                 
12 Group-conversion subscribers had higher expenses than any other Blue Cross/Blue Shield category. The mean 
medical expenditures associated with group conversion subscribers were $655, compared to $497 for regular   10
5. ECONOMETRIC  FRAMEWORK 
In order to separate the effects of moral hazard from adverse selection, it is necessary to use a 
more rigorous approach to compare Blue Cross/Blue Shield enrollees with commercial health insurance 
company subscribers. To more thoroughly examine the differences in medical expenditures and 
characteristics of Blue Cross/Blue Shield enrollees compared to commercial health insurance subscribers, 
two separate techniques are used. First, OLS is used to determine if differences in medical expenditures 
between Blue Cross/Blue Shield and commercial health plan enrollees persist even after controlling for 
differences in other variables. Because the OLS model does not control for unobservable selection into 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield and commercial health plans, a technique to account for such selection is then 
used to more adequately compare these plans and gain insights into whether or not the Blues suffered 
from greater adverse selection than did commercial plans.  
Table 4 reports the results of OLS regression analysis on the natural logarithm of annual medical 
expenditures, controlling for insurance type. The differences in medical expenditures between Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield and commercial health plan enrollees persist even after controlling for differences in 
age, income, and other variables. As Table 4 shows, individual Blue Cross and Blue Shield policyholders 
spent much more than any other insured category, spending 56 percent more than the uninsured 
population. In contrast, individual commercial subscribers spent only 26 percent more on medical care 
than the uninsured, while both Blue Cross/Blue Shield and commercial group subscribers spend about 40 
percent more. 
  The similarity of the estimated coefficients on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield-group and commercial-
group insurance dummies reported in Table 4 supports the notion that Blue Cross and Blue Shield group 
plans were no more likely to attract worse risks than commercial group plans. In contrast, the differences 
between the estimated coefficients on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield-individual and commercial-individual 
insurance dummies reinforce the hypothesis that in the individual market, the Blues may have suffered 
                                                                                                                                                             
individual (not group conversion) Blue Cross/Blue Shield subscribers and $494 for Blue Cross/Blue Shield group 
subscribers.   11
from adverse selection relative to commercial plans. In fact, commercial plans in the individual market 
had the lowest expenditures of any insured category—a fact that is not surprising given that families who 
wanted to purchase individual insurance from commercial insurance company faced rigorous screening.  
  One problem with the estimates presented in Table 4 is that they capture the effects of both moral 
hazard and adverse selection. That is, the estimated coefficients on the type of insurance dummies 
captures both the effect of having insurance on medical spending (moral hazard) and the fact that families 
with unobservable characteristics leading them to spend greater amounts on medical care may have been 
the ones who chose to purchase insurance (adverse selection). Even though the mean benefit levels of the 
various types of plans reported in Table 3 are very similar, suggesting that the most of the difference in 
the estimated coefficients is probably not due to moral hazard, a more rigorous approach that separates 
the effect of adverse selection from moral hazard is warranted. 
In order to separate the effects of moral hazard from adverse selection and to provide a more 
rigorous test of whether or not differential selection between the Blues and commercial insurance 
companies occurred in the 1950s, it is necessary to use a polychotomous selection model that is designed 
to explicitly control for differential selection into either Blue Cross/Blue Shield or commercial health 
insurance plans. The group and individual markets are examined separately using a technique that is a 
generalization of the polychotomous selection model offered by Heckman (1976, 1979), Hay (1980), 
Dubin and McFadden (1984), and Schmertmann (1994). In this case, a household is either in the group 
health insurance market or the individual market. In each market, a household has three choices with 
respect to insurance: to be uninsured, to insure with Blue Cross, or to insure with a commercial insurance 
company. Thus, the household’s insurance decision can be expressed as: 
[1]  m m m m v z I + ′ = γ *  (m = 1, 2, 3), 
where vm are iid normal random variables with zero mean and variance  2
vm σ .  *
m I  is a polychotomous 
variable such that the m
th category is chosen (I=m) iff    12
[2]  j m v z z j j j m m ≠ ∀ > ′ − ′        ) v - ( ) ( m γ γ . 
For ease of notation, let  mj j j m m z z τ γ γ = ′ − ′ ) (  and  . ) v - v mj m j ω = (  Then Im=m  j.   m   mj mj ≠ ∀ > ⇔ , ω τ  
In this form, the polychotomous model with three choices is reduced to a model with M-1 = 2 binary 
decision rules that can be estimated separately for the individual and group markets using bivariate probit 
(see Maddala, 1983). The estimates from the first-stage bivariate probit (reported in Appendices 1A and 
1B) can then be used to construct two linear, conditional expectation selection correction terms that are 
used in the second-stage OLS estimation of the natural log of total medical expenditures for both group 
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In each equation, y is equal to the natural logarithm of a household’s total medical expenditures 
(both insured and uninsured), and x is a vector containing information on the age and race of each 
household head, the family size, whether or not the head completed high school, the household income, 
and whether or not anyone in the household has a chronic illness. In addition, x includes information on 
the head’s occupation, and whether someone in the household received free medical care. The selection 
terms (L) are constructed using estimates obtained from the first-stage bivariate probit results, and control 
for unobservable selection into either commercial insurance plans or Blue Cross plans. The signs on the 
estimated coefficients on the selection terms cannot be easily interpreted (Dolton and Makepeace, 1987). 
                                                 
13 See Schmertmann (1994) for more details. The dependent variables ym are measured as the natural logarithm of 
total medical expenditures (with $1 added to avoid taking the log of zero). While it may be preferable to use a model 
that takes into account the fact that some households report zero total medical expenditures, OLS estimation is used 
because less than one percent of the observations are limit observations. In addition, it is important to note that given 
the high degree of complexity in the model, it is virtually impossible to correct the standard errors of the estimates in 
the second stage. Thus, the second stage estimates must be interpreted with a degree of caution. The variables firm 
size, union membership, and industry dummies are included in the first stage but excluded from the second so that 
the system is identified.    13
As a result, the effect of selection can best be viewed by analyzing the regression results before and after 
selection terms are added. Table 5 presents results with and without selection controls. 
  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 show results for the group market. In column (1), the estimated 
coefficient on the dummy controlling for Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage shows that families with Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield spent 39 percent more on medical care than did uninsured families, while families 
enrolled in commercial plans spent 36 percent more. Family size, income, education, and the presence of 
a chronic illness in a family are all positive, statistically significant predictors of household medical 
expenditures, and families who were recipients of some kind of free medical care spent more on medical 
expenditures than families who did not receive the free care.  
As shown in column (2), adding controls for unobserved selection causes the estimated 
coefficients on the Blue Cross and commercial health insurance dummies to rise, even though the 
estimated coefficients on the selection controls are themselves insignificant and the coefficients on the 
other variables change only slightly.
14 The estimated coefficient on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan 
dummy rises from 0.39 to 0.52, while the estimated coefficient on the commercial plan dummy rises the 
same amount, from 0.36 to 0.49. This rise in the estimated coefficients indicates that failure to control for 
unobserved selection decreases the estimated coefficients. That is, in the group market the effect of 
selection is to decrease medical expenditures—selection is favorable. The households buying insurance 
tend to spend less on medical care than did other households, a result that may not be surprising given 
that most group insurance was marketed to relatively young, working families. The fact that the estimated 
coefficients rise when selection is controlled for indicates that at least in the group market, both 
commercial and Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insurance plans did not suffer from adverse selection. 
Quite to the contrary, the plans may have benefited from favorable selection, as workers enrolling in these 
group health insurance plans were healthier than average. 
                                                 
14 Again, these estimates must be viewed cautiously given that the standard errors in the second stage have not been 
corrected.    14
  In the individual market, the results are very different, as shown in columns (3) and (4). There is a 
large difference between the estimated coefficients on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield and commercial health 
insurance plan dummies, and the estimated coefficients on these variables fall when controls for 
unobservable selection are added. The effect of selection is to increase medical expenditures—so that 
selection is adverse in the individual health insurance market. The nine percentage point decline in the 
estimated coefficient on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield dummy from 0.57 to 0.48 and the six percentage 
point decrease in the estimated coefficient on the commercial health insurance dummy indicate that 
adverse selection may have hampered companies in the individual market, and that Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield plans may have felt these effects to a greater extent than did the commercial plans. While the 
selection terms are not statistically significant, these results do provide at least some confirmation for the 
hypothesis that the Blues suffered from more adverse selection relative to the commercial plans, possibly 
because they did not rigorously screen their applicants. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
  In the 1930s, Blue Cross and Blue Shield developed to offer pre-paid health insurance on a 
community-rated basis. Early on, the Blues faced little competition from commercial, for-profit insurance 
companies. However, when commercial insurance companies did begin to enter the health insurance 
market, they experience-rated their policies, offering the lowest-risk subscribers lower premiums than the 
Blues could offer. Did the Blues suddenly face an adverse selection death spiral?  
This paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to answer this question. In 1957, the Blues engaged 
in limited experience rating in the group market, but continued to community rate their individual 
business. Further, unlike commercial health insurance firms, the Blues did not rigorously screen potential 
subscribers in the individual market. As a result, persons who could not qualify for commercial health 
insurance because of a medical condition that could only be detected by taking a detailed medical history 
or by undergoing a physical examination may have been able to purchase health insurance from the   15
Blues. If so, then these enrollees would drive up the Blues’ costs, leading to increased premiums, and 
potentially causing an adverse selection death spiral.  
This paper analyzes the difference in medical expenditures between Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
households and those households insured with commercial firms in order determine whether or not the 
Blues suffered from adverse selection in the 1950s. Medical expenditures for Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
subscribers in the individual health insurance market were higher than they were for commercial health 
insurance policyholders, even after controlling for differences in age, income, education and other 
variables. A selection model offers further, albeit limited, support for the hypothesis that the Blues 
suffered more from adverse selection than did commercial firms in the individual health insurance 
market. 
However, in the group market, there is little evidence to suggest that the Blues suffered more 
from adverse selection than commercial firms. Medical expenditures for enrollees in both types of health 
insurance plans are similar, even after controlling for differences in age, income, and other variables. 
Controlling for selection does little to change the outcome. If anything, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans and 
commercial health insurance companies both seemed to equally benefit from favorable selection in the 
group market. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly because the Blues countered the adverse selection 
death spiral caused by the entry of commercial firms by engaging in experience rating in the group 
market, at least for their largest accounts.  
A shortcoming of the paper is that results are based on only one year of data. The paper finds 
evidence that in that year, the Blues suffered from adverse selection in the individual market, although 
they did not suffer from adverse selection in the group market. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to determine why Blue Cross and Blue Shield continued to move towards experience-rating, findings in 
the paper certainly suggest that as the Blues faced continued competition from commercial firms, 
problems with adverse selection may have eroded their ability to community rate their policies. In 1957, 
they suffered from adverse selection in the individual market, since they relied solely on community 
rating and did not screen potential enrollees. In the group market, their ability to avoid adverse selection   16
even when engaging in very limited experience rating suggests that moving to experience rating helped 
them to overcome problems related to selection. Ultimately, Blue Cross and Blue Shield may have faced 
two choices: succumb to the adverse selection death spiral, or experience rate their policies to more 
effectively compete with commercial firms.    17
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Table 1: Rating Methods Used by Blue Cross Plans, 1959 
 
Type of Rating  Percentage of Plans 
Community Rating Only  28.2% 
Community Rating with Experience Rating only for National Accounts 
  16.7% 
Community Rating with Experience Rating Optional for Large Groups 
  33.3% 
Community Rating with Experience Rating Required for all Large 
Groups  21.8% 
Notes: Information on 78 Blue Cross plans nationwide. National accounts were typically accounts with 
large firms engaged in interstate operations.  
Source: Eilers, p. 218.   21








        Blue Cross/Blue Shield Insurance 
0.362 
(0.481) 
             Group 
0.254 
(0.436) 
             Individual 
0.107 
(0.309) 
        Commercial Insurance 
0.366 
(0.482) 
             Group 
0.263 
(0.441) 
             Individual 
0.102 
(0.303) 




































Notes:  Standard deviation in parentheses. N = 2,260. Firm size=1 denotes 1-2 employees; firm size=2 
denotes 3-4 employees; firm size=3 denotes 5-9 employees; firm size=4 denotes 10-20 employees; firm 
size=5 denotes 21-50 employees; firm size=6 denotes 51-100 employees; firm size=7 denotes 101-500 
employees; firm size= 8 denotes over 500 employees.  
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Occupation Dummies  Included 
 
Regional Dummies  Included 
Notes:  Dependent variable=Ln(Total Medical Expenditures + $1). N=2260. R
2 = 0.175. Omitted 
occupation dummy is farm labor. Omitted regional dummy is mountain. Free Medical Care = 1 if 
household member received free medical care.  
a: denotes significance at the 1% level.  
b: denotes significance at the 5% level.  
c: denotes significance at the 10% level.    24
 
Table 5:  Estimation with and without Controls for Selection 
 
  Group Market, n=1249    Individual Market, n=1011 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 



































Selection 1  Not included 
-0.312 





Selection 2  Not included 
0.128 





































































































Occupation Dummies  Included Included    Included  Included 
 
Regional Dummies  Included Included    Included  Included 
Notes: The dependent variable is Ln(Medical Expenditures + $1). All regressions include controls for 
occupation and region. Selection variables are constructed using estimates from first-stage bivariate probit 
(results in appendix). Variables omitted here but included in the first-stage include firm size, lodge, industry 
dummies, and union membership. R
2=.184 for column (1), R
2=.185 for column (2), R
2=.237 for column (3), 
and R
2=.239 for column (4).  
a: denotes significance at the 1% level.  
b: denotes significance at the 5% level.  
c: denotes significance at the 10% level.   25
Appendix 1:  Bivariate Probit Results 
 
  Individual Market, n=1011  Group Market, n=1249 
Variable  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 1  Equation 2 


















































































































































1.582   
Notes:  Results from bivariate probit estimation of equations [1] for the individual market (n=1011) and 
group market (n=1249). Variables included in Stage 1 but omitted from stage 2 (Table 6) include firm 
size, industry dummies, union membership and lodge membership. 
a: denotes significance at the 1% level.  
b: denotes significance at the 5% level.  
c: denotes significance at the 10% level. 